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SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE MESCALERO 
APACHE'S DECISION TO STORE NUCLEAR WASTE 
Louis G. Leonard, III* 
Throughout history, Americans have had an insatiable appetite for 
land. The desire for each individual to "own a piece of the American 
dream" has brought the dominant capitalist society of the United 
States into repeated conflict with the communal cultures of North 
America's indigenous peoples. Despite predating this capitalist cul-
ture in North America by over 20,000 years, the land-based heritage 
of most tribes suffered greatly from these conflicts. The battles were 
most dramatic in the previous two centuries where exploitation and 
crimes against Native Americans! and tribal land were obvious and 
frequent.2 Today the confrontation is more subtle but continues to 
raise serious problems.3 
One stage on which today's cultural conflict unfolds is nuclear waste 
siting, as tribes look to store low or high-level radioactive waste on 
reservation lands. Few problems are more politically charged, legally 
complex, or socio-economically controversial. Which governments have 
legal jurisdiction over such siting? Even if they have the legal power, 
will those governments take on this politically volatile issue? Is this 
an example of large corporations practicing environmental racism or 
* Executive Editor, 1996-1997, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 This Comment will use the terms "Native Americans," "Native people," and occasionally 
"Indians" interchangeably to refer to members of the over 500 federally recognized and unrec-
ognized tribes. This generalization is done for practical purposes and is not meant to diminish 
the individual cultural heritage of any tribe or member. 
2 See Charles K. Johnson, A Sovereignty of Convenience: Native American Sovereignty and 
the United States Government's Plan for Radioactive Waste on Indian Land, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. 
LEGAL COMMENT. 589, 591 (1994). 
3 See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust 
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1483 (1994). 
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tribes asserting long sought-after autonomy in order to provide schools 
and services for their people? Are these two latter possibilities mu-
tuallyexclusive? 
This Comment addresses these issues as they are currently playing 
out in the lands of the Mescalero Apache Tribe in New Mexico. It 
reviews the history of "Indian Country"4 and its exploitation, the current 
situation with the Mescalero Apaches, and the different "stakehold-
ers" who legally and politically have an interest in the outcome. It 
examines the question of who politically and legally can best protect 
the interests of the land, of the people on and off the reservation, and 
of future generations. 
Section I briefly surveys the history of land and resource exploita-
tion on reservations. Section II chronicles the history and present 
state of the Mescalero Apache tribe's involvement in the Monitored 
Retrievable Storage facility siting process. Section III addresses the 
questions surrounding legal jurisdiction and tribal sovereignty, by 
examining tribal, state, and federal claims. Section IV examines the 
ongoing debate between those scholars who believe this conflict im-
plicates environmental justice concerns and those who believe that 
principles of environmental justice are incompatible with tribal self-
determination. The Comment concludes that a conflict between self-
determination and environmental justice is illusory and counter-pro-
ductive as both approaches seek the empowerment oftribal communities 
and their increased input in the decision-making process. 
I. LESSONS OF HISTORY 
In 1829, newly elected President Andrew Jackson declared that the 
Indians must "go West," and began a policy of Indian Removal.5 
4 The term "Indian Country" is the generally accepted term for land held in trust by the 
federal government and occupied by Native Americans, often on reservations. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1151 (1994); Felix S. Cohen, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 27 (3d ed. 1982). The terms 
"Indian Country" and reservations are not synonymous. During the Allotment and Assimilation 
Periods (1871-1928) some reservation land was sold to non-Indians creating pockets of non-In-
dian owned land within reservations. See A. Cassidy Sehgal, Note, Indian Tribal Sovereignty 
and Waste Disposal Regulation, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 431, 444-45 (1994). These pockets of 
land are not considered Indian Country and tribal laws are not always applicable. See id. While 
this distinction creates frustrating questions of jurisdiction, this Comment will deal exclusively 
with jurisdictional and socio-economic issues in "Indian Country." 
5 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 81. A detailed discussion of the history of Native American 
removal is beyond the scope of this Comment. See Cohen, supra note 4, at Ch. 2 (History of 
United States Indian Policy). 
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Notwithstanding decisions by the United States Supreme COurt,6 
Jackson and subsequent chief executives used the United States Anny 
to drive Native Americans from fertile lands that the new nation 
required for its growing population, forcing them into the uncharted 
West.7 Along with those tribes forced to migrate, the West contained 
many indigenous Native tribes. Beginning in 1850, these tribes faced 
waves of westward Anglo-migration associated with the California 
Gold Rush.8 As a result, the federal government again sought to 
possess those lands inhabited by tribes in order to satisfy the new 
white settlers.9 The development of the reservation system soon fol-
lowed.10 In this way the federal government was able to place the 
Native tribes on small amounts of land that it deemed of little value 
while satisfying the land needs of the vast number of new settlers in 
the West. 
As the extensive natural resources from the West began to dwindle 
during this century, Native reservations again became attractive to 
the land and resource hungry United States marketplace. Reserva-
tion land covered over fifty-six million acres in the continental United 
States, within 310 reservations, and to the surprise of the federal 
government, much of this land turned out to be rich with mineral 
deposits as well as timber, grazing, and agriculturalland.H As a result 
of market pressure, a large percentage of reservation land is presently 
leased out to private, non-Indian interests. These entrepreneurial inter-
ests (including the federal government) dramatically over-harvest the 
6 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 u.s. (6 Pet.) 515, 525 (1832) (Court recognized Cherokee's right 
to land in face of competing state claim). 
7 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 81-92. In Worcester, the Cherokee Nation brought its claims of 
right to land in Georgia to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the Cherokee right to its land. 
See id. Jackson, however, ignored the ruling and forced the Cherokee into the infamous "Trail 
of Tears" where over four thousand Cherokee died in the Army-led migration. See id. at 83, 
91-92. President Jackson reportedly said "John Marshall has made his law; now let him enforce 
it." [d. at 83. 
8 See id. at 97. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. at 121-25. At that time, the recently developed Board of Indian Commissioners 
believed that Indians had been granted plots of land that were too large and recommended 
"[t]he policy of concentrating the Indians on small reservations of land, and of sustaining them 
there ... until they can be induced to make the necessary exertions to support themselves .... " 
[d. at 124 (quoting COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANNUAL REPORT, S. EXEC. Doc. No.1, 35th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 357 (1858». 
11 Wood, supra note 3, at 1477-81. The 56.6 million acres include 6.3 million acres of commercial 
timber land, 43 million acres of range land, and 3 million acres of agricultural land. [d. at 1481. 
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land through long-term leases often paying a fraction of the market 
worth. 12 
In the late 1920's the federal government's policy toward Indian 
affairs began to moderate slightly.13 Assimilationist policies of the 
Allotment Era were condemned,14 and a new respect for Native cul-
ture developed. The cornerstone of this period was the Indian Reor-
ganization Act of 1934 (IRA).15 The IRA was an attempt to encourage 
self-determination and cultural independence while also promoting 
economic development on reservation land, arguably for the benefit 
of poverty-stricken NativesJ6 Economic development was encour-
aged by the Act.17 One of the major provisions of the IRA (Section 
16), however, ran directly counter to the idea of cultural independence.18 
Section 16 offered tribes the opportunity to organize and adopt a 
constitutional form of government generally modeled after the United 
States Constitution.19 Theoretically, these tribal constitutions could be 
tailored individually to each tribe. In practice, however, standard 
"boilerplate constitutions" were prepared by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) and approved by the tribes.20 In most circumstances, 
these documents were not based on tribal custom or practice and thus 
were a radical change from previous forms of tribal governing.21 This 
loss of traditional culture often created a rift in tribes, between tradi-
12 See id. at 1481-82. Over 15 million acres of reservation land are leased to grazing, mining, 
and commercial interests. See id. Indian range land is seriously overgrazed and timber clear 
cutting practices by the federal government on Indian land have decimated forest and fishery 
resources. Id. at 1482. 
13 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 144. 
14 See id. The General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 
381 (1994), authorized the President to assign certain quantities of reservation land to individual 
members of the tribe who would then be free to alienate that land as they saw fit. See Cohen, 
supra note 4, at 131. This plan was revoked after a short time as officials recognized the 
corruption and erosion of the reservation land base that was occurring as a result of the policy. 
See id. at 136-42 (description of the effects of the Allotment Act). 
15 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1934) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994». 
16 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 147. 
17 Id. at 147-50. Along with Section 16, Section 17 of the IRA permitted tribes to form business 
corporations which would facilitate development with non-Indian business. See id. at 149. 
18 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1552. 
19 See id. Tribes were not required to adopt this government form, since under the recognition 
of retained sovereignty tribes are free to establish their own form of government. Id. at 247. 
Since tribes were recognized as separate nations, they were not constrained by most provisions 
of the United States Constitution except for those applied by congressional legislation. See id. 
Despite this freedom to structure their government as they chose, most tribes opted to accept 
the "constitutionally based" government. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 150. 
20 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 149. 
21 See id. at 149; Wood, supra note 3, at 1552-53. 
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tionalist members and more development-oriented members. Gener-
ally, members who were interested in encouraging non-Indian devel-
opment preferred the constitutional form of government because it 
allowed for greater business opportunities with outside industry.22 In 
this way, the IRA continued to facilitate private and government 
efforts to exploit Native populations and their expansive land base.23 
The discovery of large uranium deposits on reservation lands in the 
1950's forced Native Americans to become unwilling participants in 
the experiment with nuclear power. Over half of all uranium deposits 
in the United States are located on Indian reservations.24 Because this 
land legally was held in trust by the federal government, it was the 
easiest and most economical for the government to mine.25 Conse-
quently, the majority of federal uranium production comes from In-
dian reservation land.26 Since most mining occurred on their land, and 
reservation jobs were scarce, tribal members became the obvious 
choice for a labor force to staff the uranium mines.27 These mining jobs 
were highly dangerous and often caused the contamination of an 
entire tribe or village.28 Uranium mines and the waste products and 
pollution that accompanied them dotted reservation land, while the 
federal government and private interests made little effort to clean 
up after themselves.29 The legacy of the Cold War and the nuclear 
power boom of the 1950's and 1960's for tribes can be seen in the 
residual effects of these mines, nuclear weapons testing on reserva-
tion lands, and radiation testing on Indian miners.3o 
22 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1552-53. 
23 See id. at 1552 n.375. 
24 See id. at 1481. 
25 See id. at 1472-75 (discussing Indian Trust Doctrine and its connection to exploitation of 
natural resources on reservation land). 
26 See id. at 1482. In fact, in 1975 all federally controlled uranium production came from Indian 
reservations. See id. 
27 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 593. 
28 See Bill Lambrecht, Poisoned Land . .. Cold War Brought Mining Jobs to The Indians, 
But Uranium Mines Also Paid Off In Misery, ST. LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH, Nov. 19, 1991, at 1A. 
The effects of uranium mines in communities included increased incidents of birth defects, lung 
cancer, and other less dramatic health effects. Id. Also, in many communities, tribes built homes 
with chunks of uranium from mines, thus exposing them to constant radiation. Id. 
29 See id. The Navajo Nation alone has 1,000 old mines and waste piles and has received only 
about one percent of the cost of cleaning them up from the federal government. See id. 
30 See id. The federal government used an 1863 Treaty with the Shoshone Indians in southern 
Nevada to allow the use of reservation land to build a test site for nuclear weapons. See id. Also, 
the United States Government, aware of health studies that showed adverse effects on uranium 
miners, refused to tell miners about the dangers and instead decided to use them to study the 
effects of radiation in secret tests during the 1960s. See id. 
656 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:651 
The federal government's policy towards Indians began to change 
again in 1961 as the era of "Self Determination" was born.31 Driven 
by calls for more control of their own lives and problems, this philoso-
phy included increased recognition of tribes as "viable units of local 
government"32 and a more laissez-faire policy toward Indian affairs.33 
In accord with this policy, President Lyndon Johnson included Native 
Americans in much of the "Great Society" legislation, while calling for 
more Indian participation in planning and development of federal 
Indian programs.34 President Richard Nixon continued this theme in 
a message to Congress that called for a compromise between pater-
nalism and assimilationist termination policies.35 Despite the noble 
ideas and powerful rhetoric of the federal government's Self-Deter-
mination policy, tribes have faced a new set of problems from different 
and more subtle attacks on Indian land, as government and private 
interests have found ways to profit from the idea of tribal inde-
pendence.36 
The nuclear power and chemical industries have produced an im-
mense amount of waste along with their profits since the 1960's. As 
the production of various waste products increased, government and 
private producers of waste had to find disposal sites, leading them 
again to reservation land.37 Reservation land was initially chosen by 
the federal government because it lacked traditional economic poten-
tial and was considered "unwanted" and "unproductive" by most set-
tlers at the time.38 Prior government policies resulting in the depletion 
of natural resources and the pollution of Indian country, made many 
areas of tribal land virtually useless and thus vulnerable to this type 
of characterization.39 Recognizing the few viable uses for reservation 
31 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 180--83. 
321d. at 184. 
33 See id. The voices of tribal leaders were symbolized in the "Declaration of Indian Purpose" 
signed by sixty-seven tribes gathered in Chicago in June, 1961. Id. at 183--84. 
34 Id. at 184. 
35 Id. at 185--86. The "Termination Era" preceded the "Self-Determination Era" and called for 
total integration of Native tribes into Anglo-society by terminating the federal trust relation-
ship and tribes' special status with the federal government. See id. at 152--80 (detailed descrip-
tion of Termination Era and its effects on tribes). 
36 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1474, 1483. Wood asserts that instead of overt land grabbing, 
today's reservations face a loss of land base from "rapid development, pollution and loss of 
resources occurring within and around Indian reservations." Id. at 1474. 
37 I d. at 1484--85. 
38 See Nancy B. Collins & Andrea Hall, Nuclear Waste in Indian Country: A Paradoxical 
Trade, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 267, 293 (1994). 
39 See id. at 300, 310. 
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land, owners of nuclear and hazardous waste now use "intense market 
pressure"40 when pursuing tribal land, creating a more subtle type of 
exploitation.41 Poor tribal communities with lenient regulations, very 
low employment, and little political resistance have become economi-
cally and politically popular cemeteries for non-Indian waste.42 A sig-
nificant amount of reservation land, especially in the West, is also 
conducive to waste siting because of arid conditions and a sparse 
population with little political power.43 As a result, reservation land 
has become the home of a disparate amount of toxic and nuclear waste 
sites despite producing none of the substances deposited.44 The his-
tory of exploitation on tribal land is reflected in the despair of many 
tribal members: "They have taken our land and left us their poisons."45 
II. THE MESCALERO APACHES AND THE LURE OF THE 
MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE PROJECT 
A. A History of the Mescaleros 
The Mescalero Apaches are a division of the Apache tribe and have 
lived for centuries in the southeastern portion of what is now the state 
of New Mexico.46 Traditionally, the Mescaleros were a tribe of warri-
ors who supported a raiding culture; most activities other than acts 
of war were left to the female members of the tribe.47 The Mescaleros 
were determined warriors who successfully defended their land dur-
ing the last three centuries from the Spanish, the Mexicans, the 
Texans, and the Americans.46 After years of bitter fighting, the last 
40 Wood, supra note 3, at 1484. 
41 See id. at 1483-84. 
42 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 592-93. Unemployment on reservation averages from 30-80% 
and Native Americans are by most standards the poorest ethnic group in the country. Dirk 
Johnson, Economic Pulse: Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1994, at AI. High rates of 
alcoholism, suicide, and domestic violence on reservations have compounded problems and 
created the need for expensive programs. See id. 
43 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 300, 306; Johnson, supra note 2, at 592-93. 
44 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 311. A 1985 Environmental Protection Agency study 
of 25 reservations found 1200 toxic waste sites, while another study showed 46% of all Native 
Americans live near abandoned toxic waste dumps. See Wood, supra note 3, at 1482-83, 1483 
n.56. 
45 Lambrecht, supra note 28, at lA (quoting Fannie Yazzie, member of Navajo Nation in Oak 
Springs, Arizona). 
46 C.L. SONNICHSEN, THE MESCALERO APACHES 3-4 (1958). 
47Id. at 23-24. 
48 SONNICHSEN, supra note 46, at 31-57 (describing Mescaleros fight against Spanish); Ed 
Vulliamy, Nothing is Sacred In The Apache Nuclear Feud, THE OBSERVER (London), May 21, 
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great Apache Chiefs, Cochise and Geronimo, finally yielded to the 
United States Cavalry and were placed on the reservation lands 
where their descendants reside today.49 
The rich history and tradition of Chiefs Geronimo and Cochise are 
still apparent in the words and actions of the present group of Mes-
calero Apaches.5O In fact, the great-grandsons of both Geronimo and 
Cochise still live and are active in the present tribe.51 The 3,400 member 
tribe resides on a 461,000 acre reservation in southwestern New 
Mexico that contains areas that are both strikingly beautiful and 
relatively productive.52 The tribe runs a popular resort and ski lodge 
at the Inn of the Mountain Gods, a tax-free "Apache Casino," a lumber 
company that processes some of the tribe's timber, and a cattle herd 
7,000 head strong.53 
Tribal government is dominated by Wendell Chino, a formidable 
politician who has channeled the Apache's historic aggressiveness into 
business ventures for the reservation.54 Chino has led the Mescaleros 
for thirty years as their president, while acting as one of the driving 
forces behind the Native American sovereignty movement.55 In this 
way Chino has become a legendary figure among his own people and 
wields almost complete control over the tribe.56 Chino discourages 
outside influence and views the Mescaleros as locked in a struggle for 
their independence and cultural survival.57 He believes that only when 
the Mescalero find economic independence will they prosper and "con-
tinue the tribe into perpetuity."58 
1995, at 19 (describing waves of attack from Spanish, Mexican, Texan, Confederate, and Yankee 
forces repelled by Apache). 
49 CIYE COCHISE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS OF NINO COCHISE 3 (1971). 
50 See Michael Satchell, Dances With Nuclear Waste, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 8, 1996, 
at 29. 
61 Vulliamy, supra note 48, at 19 (describing great-grandsons of Geronimo and Cochise on 
opposite sides of Mescalero nuclear feud). 
52 See Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear Storage Divides Apaches and Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
11, 1993, at A18. 
53 Id. 
64 Satchell, supra note 50, at 29. 
66 Rudy Abramson, New Mexico Apaches Have a Hot Idea: Providing Nuclear Waste Storage, 
L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1994, at A22. 
66 Id.; see Jon D. Erickson et aI., Monitored Retrievable Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel in 
Indian Count:ry: Liability, Sovereignty, and Socioeconomics, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 73, 90 
(1995). 
57 See Abramson, supra note 55, at A22; Wald, supra note 52, at A18. 
68 Wald, supra note 52, at A18 (quoting Fred Peso, Vice-President of Mescaleros and Chino 
supporter). 
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Chino and his followers have faced a constant struggle in an at-
tempt to reach this goal. Despite the presence of the resort and other 
industry on the reservation, more than one-third of tribal members 
are unemployed and over half live under the federal poverty line.59 
The tribe also suffers from a housing shortage as well as a lack of any 
school system.60 Without youth services, many among the younger 
members of the tribe, who make up about half of the tribe's popula-
tion, are leaving the reservation for jobs in nearby towns or are 
turning to vandalism and violence.6! 
B. The Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility Project 
Faced with the reality of economic depression and lack of opportu-
nity, Wendell Chino and the Mescalero Tribal Council eagerly wel-
comed the two-pound package of materials from the Office of the 
United States Nuclear Waste Negotiator (NWN) that arrived in early 
October, 1991.62 The materials were the latest in a series of efforts by 
the federal government to find a suitable temporary site for the 
disposal of spent fuel from the nation's 111 commercial nuclear reac-
tors and dismantled nuclear warheads while a permanent repository 
was developed.63 The NWN proposal, available to any state, locality, 
59 Vulliamy, supra note 48, at 19. 
60 Mescaleros to Reconsider Waste Facility Tribal Council Vote Scheduled for March 9, 25 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 2126 (Mar. 3, 1995) [hereinafter Mescaleros to Reconsider]. The 
tribe is without a high school or any form of college. Id. 
6! See Abramson, supra note 55, at A22; Wald, supra note 52, at A18. One of the Mescaleros' 
most pressing problems is finding jobs for its members under twenty-one years of age, many 
of whom have turned to crime or are looking outside the reservation for prosperity. Wald, supra 
note 52, at A18. 
62 See Wald, supra note 52, at A18; Lambrecht, supra note 28, at 1A. The Office of Nuclear 
Waste Negotiator is an independent agency, separate from the Department of Energy and 
accountable only to the President and Congress. Erickson et ai., supra note 56, at 78. 
63 See Erickson et ai., supra note 56, at 75-78; Wood, supra note 3, at 1485. Congress passed 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,101-10,226 (1988), calling for 
permanent and temporary sites for nuclear waste. See Erickson et ai., supra note 56, at 75-78. 
The Act resulted in Department of Energy (DOE) studies at Yucca Mountain, Nevada in order 
to develop a permanent repository for the waste. See id. Ironically, the Yucca Mountain site is 
alleged to be on Western Shoshone tribal lands. Tom Meersman, Coalition Lambastes NSP 
Record, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Sept. 12, 1995, at 1B [hereinafter Coalition Lambastes 
NSP Record] (describing opposition to Yucca Mountain site because of claims that it is located 
on traditional Western Shoshone tribal lands). The Act also created the Office of the Nuclear 
Waste Negotiator to develop a program for assigning a temporary (40-50 years) MRS facility 
to federal lands somewhere in the United States. See Erickson et ai., supra note 56, at 75-77. 
This program was not voluntary, however, and faced huge opposition. See generally Erickson 
et ai., supra note 56, at 73--82 (general discussion on evolution of nuclear waste policy in United 
States). 
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or Indian tribe, called for a three-part process of studying the feasi-
bility of a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facility and offered 
substantial grant money for each stage.64 Wasting little time, the 
Mescalero Tribal Council sent its proposal to the NWN. On October 
17, 1991, six days after applying, the Mescaleros were awarded the 
first Phase I grant of $100,000.65 The Apaches were not the only tribe 
interested in the project, as sixteen of the twenty-one Phase I appli-
cations were from Indian tribes, while only four local county govern-
ments applied.65 
During this process the Mescaleros developed a task force within 
the tribe to oversee the project and employed scientists and individu-
als from nuclear industries as consultants and advisors.67 Many of 
these consultants came from the private sector nuclear industry.68 
Miller Hudson, a non-Indian, was hired as the information officer for 
the project and a chief spokesperson for the tribe.69 Hudson's former 
employer was Pacific Nuclear Corporation (PN, Inc.), a nuclear stor-
age company that is working closely with the Mescaleros on the 
project.70 While the influence of these companies is unconfirmed, Hud-
son himself admitted that if the Mescalero site is approved, power 
plants across the country may have to use the waste storage contain-
ers that are produced by PN, Inc. to ship waste to the site.71 
Five months after receiving a Phase I grant in March, 1992, the 
Mescaleros applied for Phase II-A funding that offered an additional 
$200,000; they were approved the following month.72 All nine of the 
groups that applied for Phase II-A funding were Indian tribes. The 
64 See Erickson et aI., supra note 56, at 79--81; Mescalero Apache Tribe Renews Efforts to Site 
MRS on New Mexico Reservation, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.6, at 274 (June 11, 1993) [herein-
after Tribe Renews Effortsl. An MRS facility is an above-ground container unit for temporary 
storage of spent fuel that would occupy about 400--600 acres and consist of spent uranium fuel 
pellets kept in a one- inch thick steel cylinder covered with 27 inches of concrete. Erickson et 
aI., supra note 56, at 97 n.115; Keith Schneider, Nuclear Plants to Become de Facto Radioactive 
Dumps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1995, at A19. 
65 Erickson et aI., supra note 56, at 79. 
66 See id. at 81. The extra application was from the Fifield Development Corporation in 
Wisconsin. See Tribe Renews Efforts, supra note 64, at 274. Their application was immediately 
denied, however, because the program required a governmental body. See id. 
67 Erickson et aI., supra note 56, at 92. 
68 See id. 
69 See Reese Erlich, Indians Press Clinton 7b Halt Waste Storage, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Nov. 25, 1992, at 8. 
7°Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Erickson et aI., supra note 56, at 81. 
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few county governments that applied for Phase I funding withdrew 
their applications in the face of local grassroots opposition or political 
resistance from the state government.73 On August 4,1993, the Mes-
caleros applied for the third and final stage of funding. Because of the 
local political attention that the potential site was beginning to draw 
this grant was never awarded.74 In a subtle political move, New Mex-
ico Senator Jeff Binghaman used an appropriations rider to cut fiscal 
year 1994 funding for the NWN and put the entire project on hold.75 
The action by Binghaman was but the first battle in the war over 
an MRS facility on the Mescalero Reservation. The issue mobilized 
many in New Mexico in opposition to the site. Along with Sen. Bing-
haman, the entire New Mexican congressional delegation as well as 
then-Governor Bruce King were on record as opposing the site.76 
Local communities surrounding the reservation have also opposed it. 
Ruidoso is one such town that borders the reservation and houses 
many tourists who ski at the Mescaleros' resort.77 Environmental 
groups have risen against the site as well. Groups like Save the 
Sacramentos Committee in Ruidoso have voiced strong opposition 
and threatened active resistance to the project.78 
C. The Push For Privatization 
The possibility of resistance has not daunted Chino who cites the 
power of Native sovereignty and stridently defends the project. He 
and his followers abandoned the idea of a federal agreement and 
73 Id. 
74 See id.; Patricia A. Ware, Volunteer Siting Process for Storage "Sellable," Former Waste 
Negotiator Says, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2449-50 (Apr. 7, 1995). The Office of Nuclear 
Waste Negotiator was closed January 21,1996. Ware, supra. 
75 See Pamela Newman, Nuclear Industry Endorses Private Waste Storage Venture, 22 En-
ergy Report (lAC) No. 75, at 0364-5274 (Apr. 21, 1994). The rider was added to the Energy and 
Water Development Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-126, 107 Stat. 1327 (1993). 
Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 331 n.396, 332. 
76 See Mescaleros Do About Face, Vote to Renew MRS Talks, 23 Energy Report (lAC) No. 
10, at 0888-8183 (Mar. 13, 1995); Mescalero Apaches, Nuclear Utilities Said Near Agreement 
on Storage Facility, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 133~3 (Nov. 4, 1994) [hereinafter 
Agreement on Storage Facility]. King was defeated in the 1994 election and was replaced by 
Republican Gary Thompson who has said he "will keep the door open to the Mescalero facility." 
Agreement on Storage Facility, supra. 
77 See John H. Stevens, Radioactive Riches-Apache-Pacijic Nuclear Deal is Hot, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at Cl. 
78 See id. Dave Dale, founder of Save the Sacramentos, has warned of "years of litigation and 
people lying in front of trucks .... " Id. 
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instead looked to private industry.79 "If we build it, they will come," 
declared Mescalero Vice President Fred Peso.so The tribe then ac-
cepted an earlier invitation to negotiate with Northern States Power 
(NSP), a Minnesota nuclear power company that was facing an alarm-
ing lack of storage space for its spent fuel.81 On Thursday, February 
3, 1994 the Mescaleros and NSP officials signed an agreement to study 
and design a private MRS facility on the reservation.82 During the 
next few months NSP and the Mescaleros began courting other utili-
ties nationwide whose storage capabilities were insufficient.&'! On March 
10,1994, officials representing thirty utilities from across the country 
convened at the reservation to discuss the project.84 From this meet-
ing came an agreement by thirty-five private utilities to contribute 
funds for initial studies of cost and feasibility.85 
Throughout the remainder of the year, the Mescaleros and their 
new partners worked on the specifics of the arrangement. In Decem-
ber, 1994, thirty utilities and NSP announced the signing of a non-
binding letter of intent to store waste on Mescalero tribal lands.86 
Chino believed the agreement did not need to be approved by the 
tribal population, but he was so confident about the level of support 
in the tribe that he was willing to leave the decision up to the mem-
bers.87 Instead of another sweeping victory for Chino, the powerful 
79 See Dennis Wamsted, Mescalero Leader Slams DOE Waste Initiative, 22 Energy Daily 
(lAC) No. 17, at 0364-5274 (Jan. 27,1994). 
80 See David Einstein, NM Tribe Wants to Build Nuclear Dump on Reservation, S.F. CHRON-
ICLE, Apr. 23, 1994, at A5. 
81 There is uncertainty whether the Mescaleros first approached NSP or whether they were 
actually following up on conversations begun by NSP in previous years. See Coalition Lam-
bastes NSP Record, supm note 63, at 1B; Tom Meersman, NM Tribe to Vote on Nuclear Stomge, 
STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Jan. 31, 1995, at 1B [hereinafter NM Tribe to Vote on Nuclear 
Storage]. NSP Chairman Jim Howard claims the Mescaleros approached him, but other reports 
indicate there was an outstanding invitation to negotiate by NSP. See Coalition Lambastes NSP 
Record, supra note 63, at 1B (indicating that NSP initiated talks); NM Tribe to Vote on Nuclear 
Storage, supra (quoting Mr. Howard). 
82 See John Yoder, Mescaleros and NSP Officially Sign Agreement to Build A Private MRS, 
22 Energy Rep. (lAC) No.5, at 0888-8183 (Feb. 7, 1994). Under the agreement NSP also 
committed to soliciting other utilities for participation. See id. 
83 See id. Peso said that the joint venture would require the support of 10--12 nuclear utilities 
in order to make construction possible. See Wamsted, supra note 79, at 17. 
84 Steve Daniels, Apaches Push Privatization, 232 Engineering News-Record (lAC) No. 10, 
at 8 (Mar. 7, 1994). 
85 See Newman, supra note 75 (contains list of 33 utilities and two nuclear industry contractors 
that signed agreement). Each utility contributed $5,000 to the project. See id. 
86 See Tom Meersman, Indians Say No To NSp, Others, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Feb. 
2, 1995, at 1A. 
87 See George Johnson, Tribal Democracy: Apaches Spurn a Chance to Run Nuclear Dump, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,1995, at A2. 
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leader suffered his most significant defeat as the tribe rejected the 
project by a vote of 490 to 362.88 
Tribal leaders declared that they were shocked by the vote, but 
claimed they would abide by the referendum because it was the "will 
of the people."89 Fred Kaydahzinne, a "self-described, grass roots 
tribal activist" (described by others as the Housing Director appointed 
by Chino) quickly circulated a petition asking the council for another 
referendum.90 Before the first vote the traditional female leaders of 
the tribe called the members together and made a powerful plea to 
reject the proposa1.91 During the campaign for a revote, those same 
leaders and others opposing the site claimed that they suffered from 
threats and coercion in order to quell their opposition.92 Rufina Marie 
Laws and Joseph Geronimo, also vocal in opposition to the site, faced 
pressure to vote in favor ofit.93 Laws claims that tribal members were 
"scared that they would lose their jobs or homes if they voted against 
the waste site."94 In the end, 700 signatures were collected (twice the 
number that voted in favor of the project just three weeks earlier) 
and a new vote was scheduled for March 9,1995.95 In that referendum 
the project was overwhelmingly endorsed by a vote of 593 to 372.96 
Since the revote tribal project leaders have faced several obstacles 
and have continued to refine the agreement. In the process, however, 
the pact has lost the participation of some of the original utilities that 
had supported the plan.97 Instead of the original thirty-five, some 
88 See id. 
89 Mescaleros Kill Nuclear Storage Plan, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Feb. 2, 1995, at AI. 
90 See Mescaleros to Reconsider, supra note 60, at 2126. 
91 Meersman, supra note 86, at 1A. Some within the tribe object to the MRS project because 
of the location of the facility. Emily Costello, Nuclear Showdown: Would You Store Nuclear 
Waste in Your Backyard? New Mexico Apache Tribe Says Yes! Good Idea or Raw Deal?, 
SCIENCE WORLD, Nov. 17, 1995, at 16. A freshwater stream and an accompanying watershed 
area are located on the potential site and a fault line lies just a few miles away. Id. Thus, critics 
of the location of the site argue that an earthquake could damage any facility and the resulting 
spill would cause widespread contamination. See id. 
92 Mescaleros Do About Face, Vote to Renew MRS 'fulks, supra note 76, at 10; Erickson et 
al., supra note 56, at 9I. 
93 Rufina Marie Laws is the founder of Humans Against Nuclear Waste Dumps (HANDs) and 
a leader of the opposition to the MRS facility within the tribe. Costello, supra note 91, at 16. 
Ms. Laws has run against Chino for the Presidency, but was unsuccessful. Joseph Geronimo, 
the great-grandson of the legendary Apache warrior, has faced armed attacks and scare tactics 
such as "rattlesnakes thrown into his backyard." Edward Helmore, Indians Fall Out Over 
Reservation N-Waste, THE OBSERVER (London), June 2, 1996, at 15. 
94 Costello, supra note 91, at 16. 
9fi Mescaleros to Reconsider, supra note 60, at 2126. 
96 Mescalero Reversal Backs Storage Plan, 234 Engineering News-Record (lAC) No. 11, at 8 
(Mar. 20, 1995). The account refers to the vote as "masterminded by Wendell Chino." Id. 
ff1 See Utilities Say they aren't Involved in Waste-Site Plan, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, July 
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reports indicated that support for the project had dropped to only 
seventeen utilities.98 Moreover, along with opposition from traditional 
tribal members, President Chino faced a surprise challenge in the last 
election by his former Vice-President, Fred Peso.99 Peso, once a man-
ager of the project, was backed by a traditional group called the 
"Apache Stronghold" that opposes the MRS project.1OO While Chino's 
presidency has survived the defection, the challenge shows a lack of 
consensus and growing opposition to the project. Project leaders con-
tinue to maintain that the MRS project is successfully moving ahead, 
and an application for a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC) was scheduled for early 1996.101 
In the spring of 1996, the agreement between the Mescaleros and 
the NSP-Ied coalition of utilities began to deteriorate.102 With legal 
liability, compensation, and location unresolved, the talks between the 
two groups were "indefinitely suspended" on April 16, 1996.103 Appar-
ently Chino demanded that the actual MRS site be constructed on a 
plot of land that the tribe planned to annex at the edge of the reser-
vation, in order to connect it with a nearby rail line.104 This setback 
has not put an end to the possibility of an MRS site on Mescalero 
Apache land.105 President Chino released a statement on April 18, 1996 
2, 1995, at B3. NSP announced on June 26 that 23 utilities agreed to participate and support the 
project. Id. Six of these companies later denied being a part of the agreement. Id. 
9B See id. 
99 Briefs, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Nov. 8,1995, at B3. 
100 Id. 
101 See Jon Payne et al., Innovation, Cost-Effectiveness, Technical Excellence, NUCLEAR 
NEWS, Jan. 1996, at 15. 
102 NM Tribe, Utilities Halt Talks Over Storage of Nuclear Fuel Rods, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Apr. 19, 1996, at 38A. 
108 Elaine Hiruo & Kathleen Hart, Mescalero-Utility 'fulks Crumble, Effort on Joint Storage 
Dies, NUCLEAR FUEL, Apr. 22, 1996, at 1. According to one unnamed source, the utilities wanted 
the tribe to waive its sovereign immunity, while desiring immunity for themselves. See id. 
104 See id. While Chino claimed the annexed land would be more practicable for transportation 
reasons, the coalition was concerned that placing the MRS facility on land not officially on the 
reservation would incite public outcry and protest. See id. 
106 See id. This setback for the NSP-led coalition did not end the possibility that these nuclear 
utilities will contract with a Native American tribe. See Jim Woolf, Utah's Not Aglow Over 
Goshute Deal to Store N-Waste; Goshutes Hope to Store Nuclear Waste, THE SALT LAKE 
TRIBUNE, December 25, 1996, at AI. Most of the nuclear utility companies that attempted to 
cement a deal with the Mescaleros (including NSP) have now found another potential site for 
their waste. See id. This site is also located on a Native American reservation. Id. The coalition 
has negotiated a preliminary agreement with the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute tribe in Utah. 
Id. The Goshute tribe has a mere 200 members and faces an econOInic depression similar to the 
Mescaleros'. See id. With much of the State of Utah in opposition to the agreement, many of 
these same issues may play out in Utah as well as New Mexico. See id. 
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stating that the tribe will "continue with plans for the development 
and construction of a temporary facility."106 
Instead of working with utility companies directly, Chino's new plan 
seems to involve the tribe teaming up with a large nuclear storage 
and cleanup company like British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL).107 The tribe 
and BNFL admitted that they were involved in preliminary discus-
sions about a possible partnership; however, neither side has provided 
details of what the partnership might entai1.108 BNFL reportedly is 
interested in becoming involved in the lucrative United States nuclear 
waste storage and reprocessing industry, and could become a partner 
in the construction and operation of an MRS facility on the Mescalero 
reservation.109 The partnership would then have to negotiate with 
individual utilities on the storage of spent fuel. l1O 
III. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 
One of the pivotal legal questions in the fight over an MRS facility 
on the Mescalero reservation is which government has control, includ-
ing the power to guide, influence, veto, or otherwise impede the siting 
decision. This question necessarily implicates issues of tribal sover-
eignty. Under federal Indian law, tribes generally have control over 
activities that occur within reservation borders.111 Unfortunately, the 
sovereignty issue surrounding the MRS facility is not quite this clear. 
This section provides a general road map of the legal jurisdiction of 
different governments over activities on Indian reservations. It will 
shed some light on how much power the Mescalero tribe, the State of 
New Mexico, and the federal government have in this case, and the 
106 Id. Chino noted in a press conference later that month that the tribe was already negoti-
ating with a potential new partner. Elaine Hiruo, DOE Slated to Proceed Soon On Privatizing 
Transportation, NUCLEONICS WEEK, May 2, 1996, at 4. 
107 See Helmore, supra note 93, at 15. The tribe is actually negotiating with the American arm 
of BNFL. Id. BNFL already has contracts to help clean up the Rocky Flats nuclear site in 
Colorado and the Savannah River nuclear plant in South Carolina. Id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 This strategy could be a wise business move, since many experts believe collective projects 
by utility companies like the NSP-Ied coalition of utilities are not likely in the future. See Elaine 
Hiruo, NAC's Davis Says Prospects Dimfor New Collective Utility Projects, NUCLEAR FUEL, 
May 6, 1996, at 8. Shortly after the first Mescalero agreement dissolved, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) released its final rule on market access for utility companies 
that should "pave the way for competitive markets" and make future cooperation between 
utilities unlikely. I d. 
111 Cohen, supra note 4, at 232. 
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likely implications for a private MRS facility on the Mescalero Reser-
vation. 
A. Tribal Power 
Native tribes were functioning communities with their own powers 
and forms of government long before European settlers arrived in the 
new world.lI2 These two concepts-power and form of government-
are important when analyzing Native American tribal jurisdiction. 
The federal government's recognition of tribal power is based on the 
concept of a pre-existing Native sovereignty.lI3 Tribal sovereignty 
thus is not based on any grant or delegation of power by Congress; 
rather, sovereignty is something that is retained by the tribe from its 
original power.lI4 Under federal Indian law, tribal power was recog-
nized through concepts of international law.lI5 Early caselaw treated 
the relationship of Native tribes and the federal government as that 
of the dominance of a weaker nation by a stronger nation.lI6 Under 
this theory, while the subject nation must yield to the overriding 
legislative authority of the dominant nation, it may depend on the 
stronger nation for protection, and it is otherwise independent.ll7 
This general principle of international law is reflected in the way 
tribes are recognized by the United States Constitution and in early 
constitutional law. The two references to "Indians" in the Constitution 
indicate their status as independent sovereigns. lIS In the Indian Com-
merce Clause, tribes are grouped with other sovereign entities when 
determining the federal government's regulation of commerce.lI9 The 
only other reference to Native Americans in the Constitution is to 
"[I]ndians not taxed" when determining how to apportion repre-
sentatives and determine taxes.120 This reference also implicitly rec-
ognizes the independent status of tribes and their members.121 
112 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978). 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 232. 
116 See id. 
117 [d. 
118 See id. at 232-33. 
119 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have the 
power "to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes." [d. 
120 [d. 
121 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 233. This reference shows the separate but lilnited mdependent 
status of tribes by recognizing their tax exempt status and by removmg them from the electoral 
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In early United States Supreme Court cases, the Court also ac-
knowledged the independent power of the tribes.l22 In Worcester v. 
Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall attempted to reconcile the independent 
nature of tribal power with the federal government's trust responsi-
bility to tribes.l23 Marshall concluded that "a weaker power does not 
surrender its independence, its right to self-government, by associat-
ing with a stronger, and taking its protection."l24 Based on this idea, 
tribal authority is generally presumed to be exclusive over internal 
self-governing matters within tribal territory, unless these powers 
have been limited by the federal plenary power or by treaty.125 
Despite this general recognition oftribal power, the federal govern-
ment has acted often in an attempt to influence the form of tribal 
government. Long before federal constitutional law addressed the 
subject of tribal power, Native communities across North America 
had their own ways of dealing with tribal policy and governance. 
Generally, tribal governments were based on informal and unwritten 
laws.l26 Traditional customs guided the norms of conduct of each tribe.l27 
Tribal policy on major issues concerning war or relations with other 
tribes was often shaped by consensus at general council meetings 
open to all adults.l28 This process was not necessarily quick or "efficient" 
by Western standards, and so it came under attack by the federal 
government.l29 During the early decades of this century, the federal 
government increased efforts to facilitate relations between tribes 
and non-Indians, and ultimately sought to assimilate the native people 
into American culture and life.130 
process. See id. This exclusion is restated in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution which 
rewords this section, removing the reference to slaves. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Cohen, supra 
note 4, at 233 n.10. 
122 See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381-82 (1896) (ruling that tribal governments were 
not subject to Fifth Amendment's requirement of indictment by jury); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832) (reconciling idea of guardian-ward relationship between federal 
government and tribes with idea of retained independence). 
123 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-6l. 
124 [d. at 56l. 
125 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 236. 
126 [d. at 230. 
127 [d. 
128 [d. 
129 See id. at 147-49 (describing federal government's policy of encouraging constitutional 
forms of government under the IRA). 
130 See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. The Allotment Era was the height of the 
assimilationist movement to make Native Americans citizens of the United States and erase 
tribal customs. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 143-44. While the Indian Reorganization era officially 
was less interested in assimilation, its policies actually promoted assimilation much more 
efficiently than earlier, more direct attempts. See Wood, supra note 3, at 1552. 
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The Mescalero Apaches were one of the many tribes that opted for 
a new form of government under the IRA.131 Their constitution reflects 
influence from the federal government and endorses assimilationist 
ideas.132 The general form of government is familiarly divided into 
three branches: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.133 
Under this constitution the tribe has considerable power that is broadly 
delegated to the branches. l34 The division of power among branches 
is somewhat misleading however, as the constitution encourages ac-
cumulation of power in the tribal council, which is controlled by the 
President.135 First, the President presides as head of the tribal council, 
which is the legislative branch, thus effectively consolidating the ex-
ecutive and legislative power.136 The President's power also includes 
the power to "appoint all non-elected officials,"137 "establish such boards, 
committees or sub-committees as the business of the council may 
require, ... serve as an ex-officio member of all such committees,"138 
"serve as contracting officer for the Mescalero Apache Tribe,"139 "di-
rect the tribal police,"14o appoint trial court judges, and sit on the tribal 
Court of Appeals.141 In this way the Mescalero Constitution offers the 
opportunity for extreme consolidation of power in the President, an 
opportunity of which Wendell Chino has taken full advantage. 
This constitutional form of tribal government is in extreme contrast 
to the traditional form of government prevalent in tribes before the 
IRA.142 Consolidation of power in the few members of the tribal coun-
cil and especially in the President have replaced earlier ideas of con-
131 See MESCALERO CONST. (approved Mar. 25, 1936), reprinted in 4 OCCASIONAL PUBLICA-
TIONS IN ANTHROPOLOGY 16-31 (George E. Fay, ed., 1967). 
132 See id. preamble. The Preamble to the Constitution includes the assimilatist goal of 
''bring[ing] our representative tribal government into closer alignment with State and National 
governments .... " See id. 
133 See id. art. VII. 
134 See id. art. XI (describing powers of tribal council); art. XXII (describing powers of the 
president); art. XXV (describing powers of tribal court). 
135 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1553. 
136 See MESCALERO CONST. art. XXII, § 1, cl. (a); Wood, supra note 3, at 1553. Article XXII 
officially does not allow the President to vote on the tribal council, but he sits as Chairman and 
may vote to break a tie. MESCALERO CONST. art. XXII. The President may also veto tribal 
council decisions. Id. art. XXII, § 1, cl. (e). 
137 MESCALERO CONST. art. XXII, § 1, cl. (b). 
133 Id. art. XXII, § 1, cl. (c). 
139Id. art. XXII, § 1, cl. (d). 
14°Id. art. XXII, § 1, cl. (g). 
141Id. art. XXVI, § 1, § 2. The entire tribal council sits as a court of appeals "whenever 
necessary." Id. 
142 See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. 
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sensus and inclusion of all tribal members in the process.143 Traditional 
religious or spiritual leaders who represent the culture and history of 
the tribe often clash with those development-minded members of the 
tribe who frequently seek government offices.144 The legitimacy of 
decisions of these governments are often questioned based on claims 
of fraud, unfairness, or abuses of process.145 Problems of this nature 
allegedly have been present in the Mescalero government throughout 
the MRS process.146 Decisions of official tribal governments are often 
criticized for not being truly representative of marginalized tradi-
tional groups or other tribal members who are not a part of the 
President's inner circle.147 
Nevertheless, the broad constitutional power granted to the IRA-
created tribal governments provides the necessary legal authority for 
the tribe to develop the MRS project within its borders.148 The con-
stitution vests in the president the authority to serve as the contract-
ing officer for the tribe, a power Chino used to approve the agreement 
with the utilities.149 It also provides the tribal council with the power 
to lease land, which will be necessary once a site is chosen.15o The only 
question concerning tribal power is whether the tribe is superseded 
by federal or state law. The federal government's reconstruction of 
tribal governance through the IRA does invite a continuing debate: 
are tribal decisions actually made by the tribe itself or does the 
consolidation of power in the president remove all others from the 
decision-making process.151 
B. Federal Power 
Any discussion of the power of the federal government over reser-
vation land must include both an analysis of the breadth of the federal 
143 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1552-53. 
144 See id. at 1551-53. 
145 See id. at 1553. 
146 See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (describing possible fraud and corruption 
during second vote on MRS site by tribe). 
147 See id. at 1553-55 (discussing tendency of IRA fonn of government to encourage corrup-
tion, centralization of power without benefit of separation of powers or "sunshine laws" to 
provide government accountability). 
148 See supra notes 135--41 and accompanying text. This authority is of course subject to 
potential federal and state power. See infra Section III (B) (Federal Power), Section III (C) 
(State Power). 
149 CONST. art. XI, § 1, cl. (d). 
150 [d. art. XI, § 1, cl (b). 
151 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1553-55. 
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plenary power, and the limitations and responsibilities of the federal 
government embodied in the "Trust Doctrine."152 The issue of federal 
power over tribal lands presents few questions concerning where the 
legal power lies.153 In three early United States Supreme Court cases, 
known as the "Marshall trilogy," the framework of Native sovereignty 
was developed based on principles of international law. The Court, 
however, simultaneously granted significant regulatory power to Con-
gress over tribal lands. 1M The sources of the plenary power rest in 
various parts of the Constitution that together created "a single power 
over Indian affairs, an amalgam of several constitutional provisions."155 
The Court likened tribes to "domestic dependent nations,"156 but lim-
ited this grant of power to the federal government, not the states, to 
regulate Indian affairs.157 
Along with this general plenary power over Indian affairs granted 
to Congress, the United States Supreme Court has also recognized a 
general responsibility to protect Indian rights.158 The Court in Chero-
kee Nation v. Georgia first described this responsibility as that of "a 
ward to his guardian,"159 giving birth to the Trust Doctrine and the 
recognition of a fiduciary relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the tribes.160 The Court developed the basic parameters of 
federal power recognizing a generally autonomous tribal government, 
subject to congressional authority, but largely free from state contro1.161 
152 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 212-21 (discussion of plenary power and trust doctrine). 
153 See Jennifer Smith Haner, Tribal Solutions to On-Reservation Environmental Offenses: 
Jurisdictional Parameters, Cultural Considerations, and Recommendations, 19 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 105, 109 (1995). 
154 Sehgal, supra note 4, at 435--36 (1994). These cases were Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). A complete development of the legal contours of Native 
American sovereignty is beyond the scope this Comment. See Cohen, supra note 4, at Ch. 3 
(comprehensive exanrination of Indian sovereignty law). 
155 Cohen, supra note 4, at 211. These provisions include the Indian Commerce Clause, which 
grants Congress power to regulate commerce with the various Indian tribes; the Property 
Clause, which grants power to Congress to dispose of and regulate territory and property 
belonging to the United States; the Treaty Clause, which grants power to the President to make 
treaties; the Supremacy Clause, which makes federal law supersede any state law that comes 
into conflict with it; and the Necessary and Proper Clause. See id. at 207-11. 
156 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
157Id. at 16--17. 
158 Id. at 17. 
159Id. 
160 Wood, supra note 3, at 1472 (discussing trust doctrine generally). 
161 Mary Beth West, Natural Resources Development on Indian Reservations: Overview of 
Tribal State and Federal Jurisdiction, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 71, 72 (1992). 
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The federal plenary power grants broad latitude to Congress to leg-
islate specifically with respect to triballands.162 Pursuant to this power, 
most environmental and other regulatory legislation specifically addresses 
Indian Country, making most regulatory law applicable there.163 Com-
plementing this authority, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that most general federal statutes that simply refer to "all persons" 
include Indians as well.164 Known as the "Tuscarora Rule," this as-
sumption of applicability requires either evidence of a statutory scheme 
requiring national or uniform application, or legislative history show-
ing a congressional intent to invade tribal rights.165 Under this general 
plenary power, Congress has virtually unlimited authority to legislate 
with respect to Native Americans.166 
The broad federal plenary power over tribal lands rests solely with 
Congress and not federal agencies.167 However, federal programs deal-
ing with tribes historically have been enforced by certain executive 
departments.163 The most prominent example is the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA).169 Under congressionally delegated authority, the BIA 
manages most reservation land as an outgrowth of the federal gov-
ernment's legal designation as trustee of the land.170 The BIA's man-
agement authority includes direct supervision over land and resource 
development through resource allocation, contract negotiation, and 
the collection of royalties.171 The BIA also has "approval power" to 
validate or void tribal council decisions on certain uses of reservation 
land.172 All leases of Indian land and resource development agree-
ments must have BIA approval.173 Some commentators feel that these 
162 Haner, supra note 153, at 112-13. 
163 See id. at 116 (describing environmental laws that specifically address Indians, including 
Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, and others). 
164 Id. at 113. The Court first recognized this power in Federal Power Commission v. Tus-
carora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960). 
165 See Haner, supra note 153, at 114. 
166 See id. at 109. 
167 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 225; Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control 
of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State 
Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581, 587 (1989). 
168 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1478. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. The trust designation accepted today does not originate in the United States 
Constitution or treaties with tribes. Id. at 1478 n.30. Instead, it traces its roots to various 
Congressional assertions of authority under the Indian General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 348 
(1988), and Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1934). Id. 
171 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1478-79. 
172Id. at 1479. 
173Id. 
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direct and paternalistic powers of oversight have great potential to 
suffocate all Native power over their lands.174 
In the Self-Determination Era, however, Congress and federal ad-
ministrative agencies have taken steps to voluntarily restrain their 
vast power and promote autonomy within tribes.l75 Under Presiden-
tial leadership, federal agencies have worked to initiate a more lais-
sez-faire policy toward tribal relations.176 Under current policies, the 
BIA for instance, will no longer force a tribe to accept a lease or 
transaction that has been opposed by the tribal council, and as a 
practical matter BIA approves all transactions that tribal govern-
ments endorse.177 Along the same lines, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has developed an "Indian Policy" that calls for working 
with tribal governments on a "government to government" basis and 
taking into account tribal "interests and concerns" whenever EPA 
takes action on Indian lands.178 As an outgrowth of this policy, the 
EPA and Congress developed an extensive program of educating and 
providing technical assistance to tribes in order to make a govern-
ment-to-government relationship more feasible.179 This plan includes 
the Indian Environmental General Assistance Program Act of 1992, 
which provides funding for tribes to investigate and determine their 
environmental protection needs.l80 The EPA has also joined with other 
administrative agencies that deal with tribal issues to develop a Na-
tional Memorandum of Understanding to allow for a more compre-
hensive and coordinated approach to Native American issues.181 Fi-
nally, the EPA has developed a Native American Network under the 
Office of Solid Waste.l82 This program holds training sessions on solid 
waste management for tribal officials and provides "solid waste circuit 
riders" who travel to reservations in order to offer hands-on technical 
174 See id. at 1479-80 (describing difference between past and present uses of approval power 
by BIA). 
175 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text; Cohen, supra note 4, at 180-204. 
176 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 180-204. 
177 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1480. 
178 Martin D. Topper, Environmental Protection in Indian Country: Equity or Self-Determi-
nation, 9 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL COMMENT. 693, 695 (1994). 
179 Id. at 697. 
ISO Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4368(b) (1994». 
181Id. The BIA, the Indian Health Service, and the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development were the other agencies. Id. at 697-98 (exploring specifics of plan and its suc-
cesses). 
182 Id. at 698. 
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assistance for tribes to develop their own solid waste disposal pro-
grams.183 Through programs like these, some agencies have moved 
toward self-restraint in tribal affairs while others have worked affir-
matively to make self-determination a reality.l84 
In contrast to the broad and seemingly limitless plenary power of 
Congress, the Trust Doctrine defines the responsibilities of the federal 
government to follow a fiduciary duty in its actions toward tribes.l85 
The Trust Doctrine, along with certain constitutional provisions, are 
the only legal checks on federal power over tribes.186 The Trust Doc-
trine was first recognized in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, when Chief 
Justice Marshall described the relationship between Natives and the 
federal government as that of "a ward and its guardian."187 The doc-
trine has not been viewed as an independent source of federal author-
ity, but instead it has been used as a constitutional standard of review 
and a standard of conduct that government agents must meet in their 
dealing with Indians.l88 Because most dealings with tribes are ex-
pressed in agreements, statutes, executive orders, and regulations, 
the doctrine offers a method of reviewing these actions in light of a 
fiduciary duty.189 
The constitutionality of congressional action affecting Indians can 
be reviewed under the Trust Doctrine.l90 The United States Supreme 
Court offered a test for legislative action in Morton v. Mancari,l9l 
requiring congressional statutes that deal with Indians to be "tied 
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the 
Indians .... "192 Some commentators believe that this standard of re-
183 See Topper, supra note 178, at 699. 
184 See id. 
185 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1472. 
186 See West, supra note 161, at 72-73. Congress is bound by the Fifth Amendment "Takings 
Clause." See id. Also judicial review of congressional action is possible under a "tied rationally" 
standard that requires legislation to be "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique 
obligation towards the Indians." Cohen, supra note 4, at 218 (quoting Delaware Tribal Bus. 
Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977». 
187 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
188 Cohen, supra note 4, at 220-21. 
189 See id. The doctrine is most successfully used as a method of review where the federal 
government is already obligated in some way to act under a statute or treaty; the trust 
argument is weaker when argued as an affirmative duty for the government to act. See United 
States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983). 
190 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 221. 
191 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
192 I d. at 555. 
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view, while deferential, may impose substantive limits on congres-
sional actions.193 At least when promulgated under the plenary power, 
the Trust Doctrine seems to require that "statutes be based on a 
determination that the Indians will be protected."194 
The Trust Doctrine also serves as a check on federal administrative 
power by mandating a standard of conduct for all administrative 
agencies that work with tribes.195 This standard of conduct holds agen-
cies to "moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust"l!J6 as 
well as a duty of loyalty found in ordinary trust law.197 These strict 
duties and obligations are especially important since many adminis-
trative agencies that deal with tribes have their own agenda that may 
be in conflict with the best interests of tribes or reservation land.198 
The Trust Doctrine may be used in this way by tribal members to 
challenge practices such as the BIA's approval power over land uses 
when this approval is in violation of its duty of loyalty to Indian 
interests.199 
In the case of the Mescaleros, the Office of the Nuclear Waste 
Negotiator (NWN) acted under the federal plenary power. The NWN 
was an administrative office working pursuant to a congressional 
mandate, thus invoking the plenary power.2OO Because the Mescalero 
project is now a private agreement, a plenary power analysis based 
on the NWN is no longer relevant. At present, the siting of a private 
MRS facility remains outside the direct scope of a federal statute.201 
The MRS facility still requires a license from the NRC, and may be 
subject to other environmental and safety regulations surrounding 
the transport of nuclear waste.202 Moreover, in reaction to the Mes-
calero situation several bills are now pending before Congress that 
193 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 221. 
194 [d. 
195 [d. at 225. 
196 [d. at 226 (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942». 
197 See id. at 227. 
198 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 227-28. This is especially true with respect to agencies that 
are not directly dealing with Indian policies, such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or 
the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, whose primary goals are to find a site for nuclear 
waste, not manage Indian affairs. See id. 
199 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1551. 
200 See Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,101, 10,241-10,251 
(1988). 
201 See id. The NWPA Amendments of 1987 entrusted the formulation of the MRS process to 
the NWN, however, that office has been discontinued, leaving the regulation of the MRS process 
in doubt. See Ware, supra note 74, at 2449. 
202 See Mescalero Apaches Private SF Storage Plan Moves Ahead; Federal Program Stalled, 
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would directly regulate private MRS storage facilities.203 These bills 
could be passed into law under the plenary power and would apply on 
reservation land. 
C. State Power 
While the analysis of federal power within reservation borders is a 
fairly predictable exercise, the question of when state laws are en-
forceable on reservation land is a much more complex and uncertain 
inquiry.204 When the jurisdictional question involves hazardous and 
nuclear waste the debate becomes especially heated.205 States argue 
that these sites will affect their quality of life and therefore they 
should have some control over the land.206 Tribes, on the other hand, 
assert that if they surrender power to the states, these states will 
continue to use Native land as a dumping ground.207 The problem is 
further complicated by the quagmire of jurisdictional issues that sur-
round questions of state power within reservations.208 Important dis-
tinctions exist based on whether the laws in question would impact 
Natives or non-Natives, Native owned property or non-Native owned 
property; and whether the jurisdiction asserted is civil, criminal, or 
regulatory.209 Each of these differences can have a dramatic impact 
upon whether state or tribal power is recognized.210 
1. State Power Over Natives in "Indian Country"211 
The general proposition that states do not have authority over 
Indian affairs in Indian Country traces its roots back to the Marshall 
Nuclear Waste News (lAC), Dec. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, lAC Energy 
and Oil File [hereinafter Federal Program Stalled]. 
203 See SF Interim Storage Nuclear Industry Cool to Senate Bill Privatizing SF Storage Site, 
15 Nuclear Waste News (lAC) No. 50, at 0276-2897 (Dec. 21, 1995) [hereinafter SF Interim 
Storage]; Federal Program Stalled, supra note 202. Presently, there are two major bills in the 
area. S. 1478, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (sponsored by Sen. Rod Grams (R-Minn»; H.R. 1020, 
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (sponsored by Rep. Fred Upton (R-Mich». See id. Both of these 
bills would regulate private MRS facilities. See Federal Program Stalled, supra note 202. 
204 See Haner, supra note 153, at 109. 
200 See Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 652-53. 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
208 See Haner, supra note 153, at 109. 
209 See Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 597, 606-07. 
210 See id. 
211 It is important to remember the distinction between "Indian Country" and reservation 
land. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Reservation land does not necessarily consist 
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trilogy, specifically Worcester v. Georgia.212 In that case, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a Georgia law was "extra-territorial," 
meaning it was not recognizable on Indian land absent the consent of 
Congress.213 This general prohibition on state jurisdiction over Indian 
Country has been modified substantially in the 160 years since the 
Worcester decision, yet the general principle still underlies most de-
cisions involving state power over tribes.214 The expansion of state 
power has arisen as a result of the presence of non-Indians in Indian 
Country as well as the Supreme Court's differentiation between civil, 
criminal and regulatory authority.215 
State civil and criminal jurisdiction over a tribe or its members 
while in Indian Country remains barred absent an express grant of 
congressional authority, following the Worcester holding.216 The clear-
est example of a grant of such power to states is under "Public Law 
280."217 Generally speaking, Public Law 280 required some states and 
permitted others to take civil and criminal jurisdiction over all or most 
of the reservations within their borders.218 New Mexico was not one 
of the states that was either required to or opted to exercise this 
jurisdiction.219 
In the area of regulatory authority over tribal land and its mem-
bers, Indian law has turned away from the absolute restrictions voiced 
in earlier opinions in favor of a more flexible approach.220 State juris-
diction is now based on a detailed factual analysis, structured around 
entirely of "Indian Country." See id. Those lands within reservations that are owned by non-
Natives or areas where there is a substantial amount of non-Native ownership fall outside the 
"Indian Country" definition and usually allow for more state control. See Sehgal, supra note 4, 
at 444. This section deals only with state power over activities within "Indian Country." 
212 See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832). 
213 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 261-64 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at 542, 561). 
214 See id. at 261. Some commentators argue that there is a presumption against the applica-
tion of state laws within reservation borders based on the Court's reluctance to permit state 
jurisdiction. See Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 601. 
215 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 261; Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 604. 
216 See Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 604. 
217 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1162, 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1994)). A detailed analysis of the history and effects of Public Law 280 are 
beyond the scope of this Comment. See Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 607-11 (detailed 
analysis of statute); see also Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdic-
tion Over Reservation Indians, 22 U .C.L.A. L. REV. 535 (1975) (policy and limits of Public Law 
280). 
218 Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 607-08. 
219 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 362 nn.122-25. (describing states that did exercise some portion 
of jurisdiction allowed under Act). 
220 See Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 601. 
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a two-part "preemption/infringement" test, set out in two United 
States Supreme Court opinions.221 In Williams v. Lee,222 the Court 
declared that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has 
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reser-
vation Indians to make their own laws and be governed by them."223 
This emphasis on infringement was tempered by the Court in McCla-
nahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission224 where the opinion focused 
not only on whether there was a tribal law or custom dealing with the 
matter, but also whether the issue more properly fell in a sphere of 
congressional statute or power.225 In fact, the Court in McClanahan 
diminished the importance of the infringement prong, stating that the 
"trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty 
[or the infringement prong and toward] reliance on federal preemp-
tion."226 
Since this shift to preemption as the focus for analyzing state power 
over tribes, a "special type of federal preemption unique to Indian 
law"227 has developed. Of course the classic example of federal pre-
emption-a specific federal statute superseding a state law on the 
same issue--continues to apply in the Indian context.228 In cases where 
a federal law or treaty does not explicitly cover the same issue, federal 
law can still be said to preempt state law.229 Essentially, this special 
preemption analysis is a general balancing test, weighing federal and 
tribal interests in regulating the activity against similar state inter-
ests.230 The inquiry was summarized by the United States Supreme 
Court in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe.221 The Court held 
that a state law is preempted if "it interferes or is incompatible with 
federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state 
221 See Haner, supra note 153, at 115; Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 60l. 
222358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
223 [d. at 220. 
224 411 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1973). 
226 See id. 
226 [d. 
227 Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 602. 
228 See Haner, supra note 153, at 116. This is a standard analysis under the Supremacy Clause 
and is especially relevant now that Congress has delegated much authority to tribes by treating 
them as states under many environmental statutes. See id. In cases such as this, tribal law made 
pursuant to a federal statute would preempt state law under a standard Supremacy Clause 
analysis. See id. 
229 Haner, supra note 153, at 116. 
230 See id. 
231 462 U.S. 324, 333--34 (1983) (tribal regulatory scheme covering fish and wildlife, approved 
by federal government, preempts state fish and wildlife regulations). 
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interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state author-
ity."232 In order to take into account the federal government's "over-
riding goal of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic devel-
opment,"233 the Court has recently said that this balancing should be 
done "in light of traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the 
congressional goal of self-government."234 
The special preemption test therefore seems to encompass a four-
part inquiry, examining the backdrop of tribal sovereignty; the rele-
vant federal interests; the relevant tribal interests; and finally, the 
relevant state interests.235 Many of the factors in the first three steps 
overlap greatly.236 The interests in tribal self-determination and eco-
nomic development are stressed as federal and tribal interests, as is 
the interest in a pollution-free reservation.237 The interests in provid-
ing for the health and welfare, as well as the economic development 
of the tribe, are also recognized by courts as legitimate tribal and 
federal interests.238 Balanced against these interests are the legiti-
mate interests of the state in controlling its economic and environ-
mental quality of life, preventing spillovers or other accidents, and 
restraining tribes from receiving undue economic advantage from less 
stringent tribal standards or regulations.239 Thus, leniency or lack of 
regulation by the tribe, or lack of enforcement by the federal govern-
ment in the environmental or nuclear waste context could substan-
tially strengthen a state's claim of jurisdiction.240 
232 Id. 
233 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (despite being a 
Public Law 280 state, California gambling law is preempted on reservation by federal and tribal 
rights). 
234 Id. 
235 See Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 644-49. 
236 See id. at 602 n.74. These factors also greatly resemble interests that would naturally seem 
to fall under the 'infringement' prong of the test. See id. Many commentators feel that the 
current preemption test has incorporated the infringement prong into itself creating an essen-
tially one step "special" preemption test. See id.; see also Stephen M. Feldman, Preemption and 
the Dormant Commerce Clause: Implications/or Federal Indian Law, 64 OR. L. REV. 667, 678 
(1986); Russell Lawrence Barsh, Is There Any Indian Law Left? A Review 0/ the Supreme 
Court's 1982 Term, 59 WASH. L. REV. 863, 86tHl7 (1984). 
237 See Haner, supra note 153, at 117. 
233 See Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 650-52. 
239 See Haner, supra note 153, at 118; Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 652-53. 
240 See Haner, supra note 153, at 118. 
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2. State Power Over Non-Natives on Reservation Land 
State jurisdiction over activities on reservation land does not only 
include jurisdiction over the Native Americans themselves or Native 
owned property.241 Unlike the foregoing assertions of state power, 
when states regulate non-Natives or non-Native owned property, 
Indian law generally allows more extensive actions by states.242 The 
United States Supreme Court most recently spoke on this issue in 
Montana v. United States.243 The Court put forth a general presump-
tion that states, not tribes, have authority to regulate non-Natives on 
reservation land.244 This presumption is qualified by a few important 
exceptions, which together have created three spheres of influence 
over non-Natives on reservation land.245 
First, tribal authority is exclusive where non-Natives have entered 
into consensual dealings with the tribe or its members or where 
Native sovereign interests are implicated.246 Second, state authority 
to regulate is exclusive where it does not impact those tribal sover-
eign interests.247 When a state involvement in a regulated activity is 
especially strong and no tribal interests are recognized, courts have 
allowed state power to prevail.248 Third, courts have occasionally rec-
ognized concurrent jurisdiction between states and tribes over non-
Natives on reservations.249 This overlapping jurisdiction implicates 
enforcement and administrative problems and thus has not been used 
frequently.250 Occasionally, states and tribes have been granted con-
current jurisdiction to tax certain products especially where the prod-
uct taxed was produced off the reservation and brought into Indian 
country for resale.251 
Therefore, states generally have been denied power over Native 
activities in Indian Country so long as the tribe shows a willingness 
to regulate that activity.252 States are given more power when non-
241 See Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 606. 
242 See id. 
243 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (discussing power relationship between state and tribe). 
244 [d. 
245 See Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 599, 606. 
246 See id. at 599. 
247 [d. at 606. 
248 See id. at 599--600. 
249 See id. at 606--07. 
250 See Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 606--07. 
251 See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
154--57 (1990) (concurrent jurisdiction to tax cigarette purchases by non-Native on reservation). 
252 See Haner, supra note 153, at 118--19. 
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Native persons or property are at stake.253 While consensual agree-
ments between tribes and non-Natives are usually respected,254 courts 
have reserved the right to authorize concurrent jurisdiction in limited 
cases.255 
In the Mescalero situation it is uncertain how much power New 
Mexico or other states may have over the process. Since a private 
MRS does not directly implicate the NWPA, New Mexico could argue 
that there is no direct federal preemption. A license by the NRC could 
be considered direct federal preemption.256 However, the special pre-
emption analysis discussed above does not require a directly conflict-
ing federal statute.257 A court's decision could depend on whether the 
Mescaleros develop a set of tribal regulations dealing with the MRS 
facility.258 If a tribe has no history of regulating a given activity, courts 
have been more apt to allow state regulation.259 Also, New Mexico has 
a legitimate interest in protecting their environment from spillover 
effects of activities on reservations.26o The issue of spillover effects 
could be heightened if an MRS facility is located on annexed land 
between the reservation and the rail line as Chino desires.261 This land 
is not a part of the reservation at present and would be physically 
closer to non-Indian land, creating greater spillover concerns.262 
A precise balancing may not be necessary in the area of nuclear 
waste, since the United States Supreme Court has implied that the 
federal government has "occupied the entire field of nuclear safety 
concerns .... "263 This comment has been relied on by at least one 
federal Circuit Court264 and could end the state law debate entirely in 
the favor of the federal government. 
Finally, New Mexico or any other state through which nuclear 
waste would be transported, could attempt to regulate that transpor-
tation.265 This attempt would probably fail as well on Dormant Com-
253 Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 606. 
254 See id. at 599. 
255 See id. 
256 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 339. 
257 Haner, supra note 153, at 116. 
258 See id. at 118-19. 
259 See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719-20 (1983). 
260 Haner, supra note 153, at 118; Royster & Fausett, supra note 167, at 652. 
261 See Hiruo & Hart, supra note 103, at 1. 
262 See id. 
263 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources & Dev. Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190,212 (1983). 
264 See Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1560 (9th Cir. 1990). 
265 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 335. 
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merce Clause grounds.266 On previous occasions the United States 
Supreme Court has specifically prohibited states from regulating the 
importation of waste into its borders.267 A state attempting to regulate 
the transportation of nuclear waste could face even stronger legal 
barriers since the nuclear industry and its waste is highly regulated 
by the federal government.268 
Therefore, the Mescaleros could strengthen their position by estab-
lishing a set of tribal regulations dealing with the MRS facility.269 
However, given the federal nature of the nuclear industry and the 
direct presence of the federal government through an NRC license, 
state intervention most likely is preempted.270 
IV. SELF-DETERMINATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
A. The Self-Determination Movement 
The possibility of housing nuclear waste on Indian reservations and 
the more common issue of toxic and solid waste siting in Indian 
Country have sparked a heated exchange in recent legalliterature.271 
Many scholars have framed the debate as a conflict between those 
who endorse tribal self-determination and economic survival on the 
one hand, and those in the media and the environmental movement 
who pursue environmental protection at all costs, on the other.272 
"Environmental justice" and "environmental racism" are concepts 
that have come into vogue recently. These ideas have been applied 
(some say misapplied) to waste siting on reservation land.273 This 
Section will look closely at both "sides" of this debate, in order to find 
266 See id. 
267 See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-29 (1978) (prohibiting states under 
Commerce Clause from refusing to allow waste to enter state borders from neighboring state). 
268 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 335. 
269 See Haner, supra note 153, at 118. 
270 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 343. 
271 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 2; Sehgal, supra note 4; Topper, supra note 178; Collins & 
Hall, supra note 38. 
272 See Kevin Grover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One Tribe's 
Approach to Developing A Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 63 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 933, 933-34 (1992); James L. Huffman, An Explanatory Essay on Native Americans 
and Environmentalism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 901, 919 (1992); Sehgal, supra note 4, at 454; 
Topper, supra note 178, at 693-94; Jana L. Walker & Kevin Grover, Commercial Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Disposal Projects on Indian Lands, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 229, 230-32 (1993). 
273 Sehgal, supra note 4, at 454; Topper, supra note 178, at 693. 
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the common ground that these social movements share and can use 
to improve the condition of tribes and their environment. 
The legal literature is currently brimming with articles that appear 
to draw a line between those who promote self-determination for 
tribes, and those who call for an environmental justice perspective in 
waste siting on reservations.274 One of the principal arguments for not 
interfering with tribes that choose to operate waste sites on reserva-
tion lands is the great economic boom that these sites provide com-
munities in financial distress.275 Producers of waste are often willing 
to pay much of the startup costs for these sites, enabling even the 
most impoverished tribes to take advantage of the opportunity.276 
Proponents often herald a waste site as a great source of jobs for 
tribes with high unemployment.277 Moreover, pragmatic supporters of 
waste sites quickly point out that these projects are one of the few 
development opportunities that are compatible with the limited re-
sources that tribes have left to offer: isolated land and a relatively 
unskilled or semi-skilled workforce.278 
The potential economic benefits of such a waste site for tribes are 
not usually the critical point of division in this debate. Instead, self-
determination advocates argue that environmentalists ignore issues 
of sovereignty when calling for an end to the storage of government 
and corporate waste on reservations.279 These advocates condemn the 
media and environmentalists for creating a stereotype of Native Ameri-
cans as simple people attempting to act as caretakers of nature, but 
being swindled by the government or big industry into taking waste.280 
In using this romantic view of tribal life and culture, these commen-
tators argue that some in the media and in the environmental move-
274 See Huffman, supra note 272, at 919; Sehgal, supra note 4, at 454; Topper, supra note 178, 
at 693; Walker & Grover, supra note 272, at 934. These articles address many different types of 
waste siting, including solid, toxic, and nuclear waste. While all of the arguments put forth in 
these articles do not apply to nuclear waste, most are general enough to apply to all three. This 
Comment has attempted to be true to these nuances and point out cases where the arguments 
have dealt specifically with one type of waste site or another. 
275 Walker & Grover, supra note 272, at 232. 
276 See id. 
277 [d. 
278 See id. at 231. 
279 See Sehgal, supra note 4, at 454; Topper, supra note 178, at 693. 
280 See Grover & Walker, supra note 272, at 942; Sehgal, supra note 4, at 456. A typical 
stereotype of Native Americans in this context portrays Indians as not producing trash, never 
harming the environment, being simple in their approach to complex issues, and therefore not 
being intelligent or sophisticated enough to deal with the issue of waste disposal. [d. 
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ment have ignored the idea of self-determination and Native sover-
eignty under the assumption that tribes do not want these sites.281 
Instead they contend, as this Comment has described, that tribal 
leaders are in fact actively courting waste producers.282 The "self-de-
terminationists" consider those who proscribe to this romantic notion 
of Indians and Indian life to be racist themselves and paternalistic for 
not recognizing Native tribes as intelligent people, capable of address-
ing this complex issue.283 
An example of successful siting lauded by many scholars who are 
interested in promoting tribal economic development is the Campo 
Band of Mission Indians of California.284 The Campo Band is a small 
tribe that experienced high levels of poverty and unemployment, and 
chose to pursue solid waste disposal in order to raise money for the 
tribe.286 The tribal government developed a regulatory infrastructure 
for the reservation in order to avoid state regulation; it incorporated 
Indian hiring preferences into the final private contract; and it in-
cluded environmental liability insurance for the project.286 The tribe 
faced significant local opposition to their proposal, but succeeded none-
theless.287 Proponents of tribal self-determination argue that the Campo 
Band's success dispels the "utopian visions" of some environmental-
ists that tribes do not want and cannot handle waste sites.288 Not only 
can Native Americans handle the complexities of waste siting, these 
proponents argue, but the tribes are the only ones who should make 
these choices.289 The decision of whether to pursue such a project 
281 Grover & Walker, supra note 272, at 933. 
282 See supra Section II. 
283 Sehgal, supra note 4, at 456. 
284 See Grover & Walker, supra note 272, at 933; Walker & Grover, supra note 272, at 250. The 
authors of these two articles are Native American attorneys who advised the Campo Band in 
their pursuit of a solid waste landfill. Walker & Grover, supra note 272, at 265. The Campo model 
is useful when analyzing a way tribes can develop the necessary support and infrastructure to 
realize such a solid waste venture. See Walker & Grover, supra note 272, at 232. It is less helpful 
when analyzing the nuclear waste site at issue here, because nuclear waste is subject to different 
and often more complex regulations, different questions of expertise, and a greater risk of 
serious health and environmental consequences than solid waste. See Erickson et al., supra note 
56, at 75-81 (describing federal law regarding nuclear waste and MRS facilities). 
285 See Grover & Walker, supra note 272, at 936-37. 
286 Walker & Grover, supra note 272, at 253-54. 
287 See Grover & Walker, supra note 272, at 939. 
288 Huffman, supra note 272, at 919-20. 
289 See Robert Sitkowski, Commercial Hazardous Waste Projects in Indian Country: An 
Opportunity for Tribal Economic Development Through Land Use Planning, 10 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 239, 242 (1995). 
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requires a complex analysis of costs and benefits, one that only the 
tribe should make.290 
The issue of whether the federal government should play a role in 
supporting tribal development varies considerably from scholar to 
scholar in the self-determination movement. Some call for an end to 
federal powers like BIA approval291 or the Trust Doctrine,292 while 
others layout detailed criteria for a new form of federal review.293 
Most scholars agree that some government safeguards are necessary 
in the area of hazardous waste siting.294 They caution, however, that 
these safeguards must allow tribes to make decisions without sig-
nificant interference.295 
Many of these same commentators have been critical of the role of 
an environmental justice perspective in the analysis of waste siting 
decisions by tribes.296 They argue that the concepts of industry sin-
gling out reservations for waste storage and of tribes suffering a 
disproportionate impact from hazardous waste sites are fictions cre-
ated by the media and environmental justice advocates.297 This fiction 
will not become a reality, they explain, because there is no guarantee 
that tribes will even choose to place nuclear waste sites on their 
land.298 These self-determinationists caution against applying a tradi-
tional environmental justice approach in the Native American context 
because, unlike other low income communities, tribes have the power 
290 ld. 
291 See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text. 
292 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 326 (condemning Trust Doctrine as paternalistic). 
293 See Walker & Grover, supra note 272, at 260--61. The authors suggest several criteria that 
the BIA should incorporate when evaluating waste disposal sites, including the market value· 
of the compensation, the background of the developer, and Indian preferences in hiring.ld. This 
type of BIA oversight has been criticized by others who advocate for tribal self-determination. 
See Haner, supra note 153, at 105 (criticizing proposed bill that would provide substantially 
similar oversight). 
294 See Topper, supra note 178, at 701; Sehgal, supra note 4, at 456; Sitkowski, supra note 289, 
at 242; Walker & Grover, supra note 272, at 232. 
290 See Sitkowski, supra note 289, at 242; Topper, supra note 178, at 701; Walker & Grover, 
supra note 272, at 232. 
296 See Sehgal, supra note 4, at 456; Topper, supra note 178, at 693. 
297 Sehgal, supra note 4, at 456; Haner, supra note 153, at 106. However, at least one of these 
authors went on to admit that ''many reservation communities experience desperate economic 
conditions, making members susceptible to the lure of money from exploiting weak federal and 
tribal environmental enforcement." Haner, supra note 153, at 121. 
29B Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 323. Of course, this hope has been proven wrong, not only 
by the Mescaleros' actions, but also by the imminent deal between the Skull Valley Band of 
Goshute tribe and many of the same nuclear industries that negotiated with the Mescaleros. 
See Woolf, supra note 105, at AI. 
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to make an "affirmative decision" to accept waste.299 In general, those 
supporting tribal self-determination have characterized the environ-
mentalist approach as calling for an absolute prohibition against de-
velopment on reservations; as viewing Natives in a stereotypically 
naive way; and as trying to "impos[e] its values and visions, already 
clouded by racism, upon Native Americans."3oo 
B. Environmental Justice301 
When we label an environmental practice as an example of envi-
ronmental racism, we are saying that the predictable distribu-
tional impact of that decision contributes to the structure of racial 
subordination and domination that has similarly marked many of 
our public policies in this country.302 
The issue of nuclear waste siting on reservation land implicates 
many of the same problems and concerns that surround other more 
common examples of environmental racism.303 As a result, an environ-
mental justice perspective may be helpful when analyzing the nuclear 
waste siting on native lands generally and the Mescalero decision 
specifically. Like the inner-cities in the United States, reservation 
communities experience desperate economic conditions that often force 
these communities to live with a dirtier or more dangerous environ-
ment in return for the promise of jobs and economic aid.304 Like the 
inner-cities, reservation communities find themselves the home of 
Locally Undesirable Land Uses (LULUs) because they do not have 
299 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 317; Topper, supra note 178, at 693. 
800 Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 327. 
301 This Comment will use the terms "environmental justice," "environmental inequity," and 
"environmental racism" to refer to the general concern regarding the disproportional impact of 
environmental harms and waste sites in low-income communities and communities of color. 
These terms and concepts were introduced by Dr. Benjamin Chavis of the United Church of 
Christ's Commission for Racial Justice in the early 1980's. See Richard La2arus, Pursuing 
"Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 787, 790 n.13 (1993). 
302 Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 
839, 840 (1992). 
303 See La2arus, supra note 301, at 790. The most typically encountered example of environ-
mental racism seems to be the urban centers of the United States, especially "ghetto" neigh-
borhoods or other communities within urban areas that are predominantly poor and minority. 
See id. at 788 n.6. These communities are often victims of racist zoning practices, a lack of 
government cleanup efforts, a poor housing stock, and other local living conditions that lead to 
a disproportionately dirtier environment. See Robert Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in 
Minority Communities, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 82, 
82-85 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992). 
304 See Haner, supra note 153, at 121. 
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the economic alternatives or the political power to refuse.305 Like 
inner-city minority populations, Native Americans have suffered dis-
crimination from all aspects of American society, including the legal 
system, since the first settlers arrived in North America.3oo Like in-
ner-city populations, tribal members are impacted by the "synergis-
tic" health effects of a long history of exposure to many forms of 
pollution. This history of living with pollution makes both communi-
ties more susceptible to health problems associated with present forms 
of pollution.307 The pertinent difference for this debate between these 
two minority populations who both suffer from poverty and dispro-
portionate environmental harm, is that the ghettos Native Americans 
have been forced to inhabit are governed by the.Indians themselves.30B 
Many advocates of tribal self-determination have seized upon this 
difference, arguing that respect for Native sovereignty requires blind 
deference to decisions of tribal councils.309 This approach, however, 
ignores the realities of tribal power and the history of oppression and 
control by the majority in this country.310 Simply having some measure 
of control over the governing of reservation land cannot remove tribal 
members from the list of underrepresented voices in this country.311 
Two power structures are involved in tribal decision-making that 
affect the empowerment of tribal members: the tribal system itself 
and the federal system.312 An environmental justice perspective ex-
305 See Sehgal, supra note 4, at 454; Bullard, supra note 303, at 85--86. 
306 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 313. 
307 See id. at 310, 316. "Synergistic effects" refer to the combined health problems faced by 
communities that are overburdened by various forms of pollution. See id. For example, many 
inner-city populations suffer extraordinarily high levels of asthma that have been associated 
with high exposure to air pollution in inner-cities. See Joseph J. Romm & Christine A. Ervin, 
How Energy Policies Affect Public Health, 111 PUB. HEALTH REP. 390, 400 (1996). Poor housing 
stock, high exposure to industrial pollution sources, the presence of a greater percentage of 
older automobiles and their fossil fuel polluting by-products, and more significant occupational 
hazards have all been associated with the high percentages of asthma in inner-city minority 
populations. See id. (inner-city children have twice national average rate of asthma). 
308 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 317; Sehgal, supra note 4, at 454. 
309 See Sehgal, supra note 4, at 456; Sitkowski, supra note 289, at 242. 
310 Johnson, supra note 2, at 589-95 (describing long history of federal government ignoring 
sovereign rights of tribes and only now recognizing tribal independence when it is convenient 
for waste disposal purposes). 
311 In fact, many inner-city communities that are governed by minority-controlled city councils 
are in similar positions. See Bullard, supra note 303, at 83-85. These governing bodies face the 
same "Hobson's choice;" feeling compelled to bring industries into their neighborhoods despite 
the serious environmental harms, because failing to do so would leave their people without 
economic opportunity. See id. 
312 While the power structure of the state is also implicated, it has had and continues to have 
much less of a role in the tribal context. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 259. 
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amines these power structures by listening "to the voices of the 
oppressed [and] the marginalized"313 in each system in order to ad-
dress their needs through empowerment. The goal of empowerment 
calls for opening up discussion and decision-making to underrepre-
sented groups through education and access to information.314 This 
inclusive approach to decision-making aims to create decisions that 
reflect a real consensus of those who are affected by a hazardous 
project.315 This approach is perfectly compatible with many of the 
principles of tribal self-determination. However, instead of blind def-
erence to tribal decisions, the environmental justice perspective calls 
for a more searching inquiry into federal and tribal council decisions 
in order to determine which voices or perspectives may have been 
marginalized or silenced.316 These voices must then be empowered 
with increased information and knowledge so that they can be exer-
cised in an informed manner.317 Only when this empowerment has 
occurred are environmental justice advocates willing to defer to tribal 
decisions. 
C. Self-Determination and Environmental Justice in the 
Mescaleros' MRS Facility 
As discussed above, the council structure employed by most tribes 
that reorganized under the IRA raises questions about its repre-
sentative nature and tendency to support presidential dominance.318 
This is especially true in the case of the Mescaleros. Like many other 
tribes, the Mescaleros have strongly traditional members who have 
refused to participate in the IRA-designed government, along with 
more modern members who hold positions in that government.319 In 
this way, the tribal council (and hence the rest of the Mescalero 
313 William A. Shutkin & Charles Lord, Environmental Law, Environmental Justice & De-
mocracy, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1129 (1994). 
314 See id. at 1120; Torres, supra note 302, at 843-44. 
315 See Shutkin & Lord, supra note 313, at 1120; Torres, supra note 302, at 843. 
316 See Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai, Summary, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL HAZARDS 215, 216 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (describing principles 
developed at First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in October, 1991 
in Washington, D.C., including demand for equal participation in decision-making by all stake-
holders). 
317 See Shutkin & Lord, supra note 313, at 1120; Torres, supra note 302, at 844. 
318 See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text. 
319 See Mescaleros Kill Nuclear Storage Plan, supra note 89, at A1 (describing Silas Cochise, 
great-grandson of legendary chief, as project manager for the MRS facility, and Joseph 
Geronimo, great-grandson of Chief Geronimo as traditional spiritual leader opposed to project); 
• 
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government) is unrepresentative of traditional voices and perspec-
tives.32o Furthermore, the lack of opposing views in the governing 
dialogue contributes to the consolidation of presidential power.321 
A convincing example of the Mescalero tribal council structure 
inhibiting traditional voices occurred when the elder Mescalero women 
protested the MRS facility before the first referendum, contributing 
to the initial defeat of the project.322 In traditional Apache society, 
elder women played a central role in advising and leading the tribe.323 
These elders made a powerful argument to the tribe against the 
project on the eve of the first vote. According to Silas Cochise, the 
project manager for the Council, this argument signaled the defeat of 
the facility.324 However, these women hold no office in the modern 
government, and after the initial vote their arguments fell silent 
against pressure allegedly exerted by Chino and the council.325 Through 
means such as scare tactics and influence exerted by Housing Secre-
tary Fred Kaydahzinne, these elders were unable to voice opposition 
to the project.326 Examples such as this are not considered rare in the 
contemporary power balance between traditional and modern tribal 
leadership.327 This picture of tribal governing only serves to further 
disempower those tribal members who do not agree with the views 
of the Council or President.328 This IRA-sanctioned structure also 
casts doubt on the legitimacy of complete deference to tribal "consen-
sus" when it takes the form of Council decisions.329 
Vulliamy, supra note 48, at 19 (describing irony of having great-grandsons of former chiefs on 
opposite sides of MRS issue). 
320 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1552. 
321 See id. at 1552-55. 
322 Meersman, supra note 86, at 1A. Project Manager Silas Cochise said that the elderly 
women "had a lot of influence over our younger people" and credited the women with deciding 
the election results. Id. 
323 SONNICHSEN, supra note 46, at 23-24. 
324 Meersman, supra note 86, at 1A. 
325 See Erickson et al., supra note 56, at 91. 
326 See Mescaleros to Reconsider, supra note 60, at 2126 (describing efforts of Kaydahzinne); 
Mescaleros Do About Face; Vote to Renew MRS Talks, 23 Energy Report (lAC) Vol. 10, at 8183 
(Mar. 13, 1995) (describing claims that tribal members were bribed into voting for MRS project); 
Erickson et al., supra note 56, at 91 (describing claims by some tribal members that they were 
afraid of job sanctions or attacks on relatives if they did not vote for project); Helmore, supra 
note 93, at 15 (describing scare tactics and attack on Joseph Geronimo). 
327 See Scott Morrison & LeAnne Howe, The Sewage of Foreigners, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 
370, 371 (1992); Wood, supra note 3, at 1553-55. 
328 See Erickson et al., supra note 56, at 91. 
329 Id. By some accounts over 95% of the tribe opposes the MRS studies, but no one can seem 
to break Chino's control over the Presidency. See id. The Council's decisions are additionally 
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The internal power structure of the Mescaleros is not the only 
source of repression in the waste siting issue. Much of the division 
and power disparity in tribes like the Mescalero Apaches can be 
traced to the history of control and racism by the federal govern-
ment.330 While the IRA was ostensibly passed with an eye toward 
empowering the tribes, its main effect was to institute Western-style 
democracies in tribes that were not used to or receptive to this form 
of government.331 The effect of standardizing these tribal govern-
ments was that the federal government and private industries could 
interact more easily with tribes.332 This enhanced interaction with 
tribes had the effect of making tribal governments more susceptible 
to the lure of the wealth and economic pressure associated with West-
ern capitalism.333 When combined with the historic degradation of 
their land-based economy, and their lack of additional avenues to 
economic prosperity, these economic pressures have created a situ-
ation where tribes have no real choice for economic survival other 
than degrading their land base by accepting pollution and other waste 
from distant states.334 
Knowing that tribes are in this desperate economic situation, the 
federal government is now using the concept of tribal sovereignty as 
an excuse for allowing nuclear waste to gravitate toward tribal res-
ervations.335 First, through the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amend-
ments of 1987 (NWPA),336 Congress facilitated the siting of waste on 
reservation lands.337 Today Congress is content to let the market 
direct waste siting; this naturally has led it to the inexpensive and 
politically weak lands owned by tribes. The federal government has 
a strong interest in allowing tribes like the Mescalero to house nuclear 
waste, because the NWP A obligates the federal government to take 
possession of the waste by 1998 if a suitable temporary storage facility 
suspect if claims by Rufina Laws and other opponents of the site are true. Costello, supra note 
91, at 16. Laws states that "'The bottom line is greed, power, and money,' ... because the tribal 
leaders will be the only ones to make a profit by the waste." [d. 
330 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1552-55. 
331 See id. at 1552. 
332 See id. at 1552-55. 
333 See id. at 1555. 
334 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 274 (describing land-based sovereignty and economy 
of tribes). 
336 Johnson, supra note 2, at 596-97. 
336 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,101-10,226 (1988). 
337 See Erickson et al., supra note 56, at 78-80 (describing Office of the NWN and use of grant 
money to entice governments to site nuclear waste). 
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is not built.338 It faces lawsuits from the storage-deprived nuclear 
power industry to enforce this obligation.339 These same industries are 
simultaneously courting the Mescaleros.34o 
In this way, both the federal power structure and the federalized 
tribal structure have worked to oppress tribal consensus and decision-
making power. Therefore, as they operate now, neither the tribal 
council nor the federal government emerge as a reliable source for a 
solution to this siting question. Despite many assertions to the con-
trary in the legal literature,341 principles used to further environ-
mental justice in other contexts may offer guidance here as well. One 
of the core issues inherent in the concept of environmental justice is 
a holistic or inclusive decision-making process.342 Essentially this means 
that those "oppressed or marginalized" voices must be heard and 
included.343 In the tribe's relationship with the federal government, 
this approach means there should be more tribal input. Within the 
tribe, this concept requires a more legitimate consensus among tradi-
tional and modern approaches in decision-making, particularly when 
such decisions could have far-reaching and potentially harmful ef-
fects.344 While this first step does not solve the problem, it provides a 
place to start and a standard from which to judge the results. 
Any possible solution to a problem as complex and potentially dan-
gerous as nuclear waste siting must involve the federal government 
as well as the tribes.345 As discussed previously with respect to sov-
ereignty, the federal government has completely occupied the area of 
nuclear safety and could exercise its plenary power to become in-
338 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,222(a)(5)(B) (1994); see also John C. 
Kuehner, Tribe Sees Gold in Nuclear Waste, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 30, 1994, at 
1A. 
339 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 596. In July, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia ruled that the federal government must take possession of nuclear waste 
by January 31, 1998, as required by the NWPA. Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 88 
F.3d 1272, 1277 (1996). However, because it is virtually impossible for the federal government 
to build a site for this waste by that date, the court's ruling does not solve the immediate storage 
problem. Pamela Newman, Nuclear Utilities Win Major Waste Battle, ENERGY DAILY, Oct. 24, 
1996. 
340 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 596. 
341 See Sehgal, supra note 4, at 456; Topper, supra note 178, at 693. 
342 See Shutkin & Lord, supra note 313, at 1120, 1126. 
343 [d. at 1129. 
344 See id. at 1126--30 (applying these ideas in context of Superfund clean up in New Bedford, 
Massachusetts). 
345 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 294-95; Erickson et al., supra note 56, at 77--80 
(describing federal government's active role in regulating nuclear waste). 
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volved in the development of a private MRS facility.346 Given the 
technical expertise and regulatory framework that would be required 
for a private MRS, it is critical that the federal government strictly 
oversee the project.347 This view is not an affront to tribal sovereignty 
nor is it based on a stereotypical vision of the capabilities of Native 
American tribes.348 Instead, it is a recognition that a project with the 
potential to cause dramatic, widespread danger in a short amount of 
time without careful safeguards requires the benefit offederal expertise. 
There is reason to question present federal regulation of the nuclear 
field, however, and reforms must be made in the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) generally and in the regulations that it promul-
gates.349 The NRC, long considered an agency captured by industry, 
has been criticized for being more concerned with "propping up an 
embattled, economically straitened, [nuclear power] industry than 
with ensuring public safety."35o While no specific regulations for the 
licensing of a private MRS facility have been promulgated, on June 
22, 1995, the NRC announced the promulgation of a final rule for the 
licensing of an MRS under the federal program.351 This rule, which 
provided for emergency safety procedures and notice requirements, 
was criticized during the public comment proceedings as not requiring 
sufficient safety procedures and thus placing "an unfair burden on 
local emergency responders with little or no training for these type 
[sic] of emergencies."352 The license requires the licensee to provide 
all training and notification procedures; this would be costly and would 
346 See Collins & Hall, supra note 38, at 336-37. On its face, the NWPA does not appear to 
apply to a private waste site, because the Act provides for only the government-run voluntary 
MRS program. Erickson et a!., supra note 56, at 78-82 (describing voluntary MRS program). 
However, there are at present two main bills pending before Congress dealing with private 
MRS facilities. S. 1478, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (sponsored by Sen. Rod Grams (R-Minn»; 
H.R. 1020, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (sponsored by Rep. Fred Upton»; see also SF Interim 
Storage, supra note 203, at 0276-2897; Federal Program Stalled, supra note 202. 
347 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 595. 
348 See Grover & Walker, supra note 272, at 942; Huffman, supra note 272, at 919. 
349 See Eric Pooley, Nuclear Warriors, TIME, Mar. 4, 1996, at 47 (describing collusion between 
plant and regulators as cause of failure of NRC to address safety issues raised by engineers at 
Millstone nuclear power plant in Connecticut). 
350 See id. at 48. The relationship between the nuclear industry and the NRC was described 
as the "fox guarding the hen house" by Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), because the industry 
seemed to veto Commission nominees that it deemed too hostile and NRC officials often worked 
for the industry before and after their time with the Commission. Id. at 49. 
351 Emergency Planning Licensing Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facili-
ties and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,430 (1995) (to be codified at 
10 C.F.R. pt. 72). 
352 I d. at 32,434. 
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not provide enough federal control.353 Finally, as of yet there are no 
provisions in the NWPA or other applicable laws that would provide 
training and technical support similar to that provided by EPA for 
Native projects in the area of solid waste disposal.354 This type of 
training is essential if a private MRS is to be a safe alternative for 
tribes. 
If there are adequate improvements in the federal regulatory frame-
work surrounding nuclear waste, and improvements in internal tribal 
decision-making, tribes should have the general authority to decide 
whether to allow a waste-site on their land. Increased technical assis-
tance and greater involvement by tribes at the federal level will help 
to educate tribal members from the outset and thus allow for an 
informed decision and a real opportunity for tribes to better resolve 
these issues for themselves.355 This type of empowerment through 
education and knowledge is the only way to begin to right the gen-
erations of marginalization and discrimination that have characterized 
mainstream society's relationships with tribes throughout history.356 
These are the recommendations of an environmental justice approach: 
tribal self-determination empowered by knowledge.357 
V. CONCLUSION 
This analysis of the Mescalero Apache's decision to construct an 
MRS facility does not offer any easy solutions. The issue is set in a 
long history of tribal exploitation by federal and state governments. 
The relationships among federal, state, and tribal governments have 
been shaped by centuries of federal statutes and policies, limiting a 
tribe's right to govern itself as it chooses. Suffering from these limited 
rights, Native Americans have seen their reservation land used and 
abused for the purposes of mainstream society. We must be careful, 
however, not to label all economic development opportunities involv-
ing waste storage on tribal lands as exploitation. After enduring 
centuries of poor treatment Native people must be given opportuni-
ties to pull themselves out of poverty and despair. When these deci-
sions involve self-condescension and self-degradation in the form of 
353 [d. at 32,442. 
354 See supra notes 178--84 and accompanying text (describing EPA's policy of supporting 
tribes with technical and educational assistance). 
355 See Shutkin & Lord, supra note 313, at 1126. 
356 See id. at 1130; Torres, supra note 302, at 844. 
357 See id. 
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accepting extremely dangerous nuclear waste, however, they must be 
scrutinized carefully. Legitimate tribal self-determination must be 
safeguarded by employing an environmental justice approach and 
working for a true, informed consensus within tribes through empow-
erment and education of tribal members. Only when making a decision 
with all of the appropriate information and with all stakeholders 
participating can tribes legitimately be said to determine their own 
destiny. 
Given the federal interest in staying out of the private MRS siting 
process, and the likely preemption of state power, the Mescalero 
Apaches will probably be given the freedom to place an MRS facility 
on their reservation. Before the site is built and spent nuclear fuel is 
transported across the country, Wendell Chino and the Mescalero 
Tribal Council should take all steps necessary to ensure the consensus 
of their people and to provide for their safety. As the final word on 
this project, they have a responsibility to their people and to the land. 
